Gas Follows the Payer: Why Nigeria’s Gas Goes Abroad, and What Must Change Before 2028

Bongo Adi, Professor of Economics and Host, LBS Breakfast Club

In July 2026, a single gas plant on Bonny Island received more Nigerian gas than all the power stations, factories, hotels, and offices in Nigeria combined. Nigeria LNG took 2.70 billion cubic feet a day for export. The entire domestic market got 2.03. Power plants got about 0.53.

This is not a story of scarcity. The country declared 215 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in April, enough for roughly eight decades at current output. Gas processing plants ran at about half their capacity in July. More gas was flared in 2025 than power stations received in July 2026. In late February, the system operator reported that thermal plants were getting less than 43 per cent of the gas they needed. The lights went off while the gas stayed in the ground or burned at the flare.

At the Lagos Business School Breakfast Club on 4 November, Moshood Olajide, who runs Axxela, put the explanation in five words: molecules follow the most reliable payer. I went back to the regulators’ own numbers to test that claim. It holds.

The queue nobody announces

In a free market, scarce goods go to whoever bids highest. Nigeria’s domestic gas market is not free. Prices to power are set by regulation, at $2.18 per million British thermal units since March. When price cannot move, sellers ration by something else. Economists have known this since Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss showed that banks facing risky borrowers ration credit rather than raise interest rates. Gas producers facing risky buyers do the same.

Picture the queue from a producer’s desk. At the front stands NLNG: long-term contracts, creditworthy foreign buyers, payment in dollars. Next come the fertiliser makers, who earned about $2.2 billion from urea exports and pay reliably. Then industrial and commercial customers, who pay more than power and can be cut off if they do not pay. At the back stands the power sector, which pays in naira, late, and often not at all.

The numbers behind that last position are stark. Generation companies say they are owed ₦6.8 trillion, with the amount rising by about ₦200 billion every month. The usual suspects are the distribution companies, but they paid about 94 per cent of their market bills in the first half of 2026. The hole sits elsewhere. The government has covered about half the cost of electricity generation as a subsidy, and that subsidy isn’t paid in full in cash because tariffs have been frozen since July 2024. Geregu and Transcorp, two listed generators, collected only about half of what they billed in 2025. Each passed the shortfall on to its gas suppliers, which, by year-end, were owed more than a year’s worth of gas. A producer that sells to power is not selling gas. It is extending an unsecured loan to the Treasury.

That is why the Domestic Gas Delivery Obligation continues to fall short. Producers delivered 2.05 billion cubic feet a day in the first half of 2026 against an obligation of 3.16, about 65 per cent. Of the 63 producers, only 23 supplied the domestic market. An obligation that costs less to breach than to honour will be breached.

Why raising the price is not enough

The reflex answer is to raise the regulated price. On its own, it does not work, and 2026 shows why. In March, the regulated gas price to power rose from $2.13 to $2.18. Over the next seven months, domestic gas supply grew by about 8 per cent, yet power received 13 per cent less gas than in the four months before. Gas-based industries got 20 per cent more. If the tariff does not move and the subsidy is not paid, a higher gas price simply enlarges an invoice the chain cannot settle. The producer is promised more and collects the same. Payment security, not price, is the variable that moves supply.

The Federal Government has started in the right place. In April, it approved ₦3.3 trillion as the full and final settlement of verified legacy power debts, and bond issuance is underway. But settlement deals with the stock of debt. The flow continues at roughly ₦200 billion a month. At that pace, the hole refills inside two years.

The 2027 collision

The timing makes this urgent. Train 7 at NLNG is about 93 per cent complete and is expected to start in the second half of 2027. It will add roughly 8 million tonnes of capacity per year and require around 1.1 billion cubic feet of new feedgas per day. Nigerians vote for a president on 16 January 2027. And the midstream regulator has set 24 September 2028 as the target date to end regulated domestic gas pricing.

Export demand will arrive before domestic reforms mature, with an election in between. If nothing changes, the queue stays the same and simply gets longer at the front.

This need not mean exports against Nigerians. Train 7’s gas is meant to come largely from new fields, and Nigeria flares and burns more gas in the field than its power sector uses. Restricting exports would not create a single domestic molecule where processing, pipes and payment are missing. The task is to make the domestic buyer one that producers want to serve.

Four things, in the right order

  1. Fund, settle and secure. Pay the electricity subsidy in cash every month, or move tariffs towards cost so the subsidy shrinks. Pay gas suppliers their verified share of the settlement directly, and route new gas-to-power payments through an escrow that pays them first. The test is simple: new arrears should fall from about ₦200 billion a month to near zero.
  2. Open the pipes. As OB3 and the Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano line come on stream, publish standard gas sale and transport terms and allow capacity booking. Bankable domestic contracts need predictable access.
  3. Make compliance visible. Publish monthly, producer-by-producer delivery against the domestic obligation, and widen the swap framework so willing producers can deliver through partners with infrastructure.
  4. Free prices last, and power last of all. Move industrial and commercial gas to negotiated prices first. Liberalise power only when it can pay. If the government wants cheaper gas for a sector, it should fund that choice openly from the budget, not push it upstream as unpaid bills. The same warning applies to compressed natural gas for vehicles: a forced low price becomes the next receivable.

The leadership lesson

For business leaders, the message is practical. Industrial and commercial buyers should expect gas prices to move towards cost-reflective levels by 2028. Those who lock in supply now, with bankable contracts and credit support, will be served first. Investors should look less at trunk lines and more at connections, distribution and the payment structures that make demand bankable.

For policymakers, the lesson is institutional. Nigeria does not lack gas, pipelines or plans. It lacks a domestic buyer whose promise to pay is believed. Build that credibility, and the gas will follow. It always follows the payer.

The author’s analysis is based on official data from NUPRC, NMDPRA, NERC and NISO for 2025–2026. A full academic treatment is in preparation.